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Aboriginal Rights in Transition:
Reassessing Aboriginal Title and
Governance
KENT McNEIL
In the past five years, there have been some very significant political and
legal developments in relation to the Aboriginal peoples of Canada. On 1 April
1999,Nunavut emerged as a new territory in the central Arctic, under the de facto
control of the Inuit residents who comprise about 85 percent of the population.
The previous August, the Nisga'a Agreement was initialed in British Columbia
after almost twenty-five years of negotiations. This is the first modem landclaims agreement to be signed in a province where most of the land is claimed by
Aboriginal peoples by virtue of their Aboriginal title. On 7 January 1998, the
Canadian government announced a new policy of reconciliation with the
Aboriginal peoples, aimed at strengthening Aboriginal governance and economic
development, and healing some of the wounds caused by the tragic legacy of the
residential school system. This policy initiative was in partial response

to

the

massive five-volume Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples,
released in the fall of 1996, that condemned Canada for its past treatment of the
Aboriginal peoples and recommended a fundamental restructuring of the
relationship based on principles of mutual recognition, respect, sharing, and
responsibility.
These political arrangements and policy initiatives have been matched by
equally dramatic developments in the law of Aboriginal rights by the Supreme
Court of Canada. In a series of important decisions, the Court has come to

grips with a number of issues that it did its best to avoid in the past, involving
the identification and definition of Aboriginal rights, the content of
Aboriginal title to land and the requirements for proving it, and the
relevance of the law of New France to Aboriginal rights today. This paper will
focus on these recent developments in the law, as well as attempting to
identify areas where the law of Aboriginal rights is incomplete and so
requires further judicial elucidation.

Constitutionalization

of Aboriginal Rights and the "Integral to the

Distinctive Culture" Test

Prior to three decisions released by the Supreme Court in August of
1996, which are collectively known as the Van der Peet trilogy, there were no
clear legal guidelines for identifying and defining Aboriginal rights. Those
rights were generally known to arise from the precolonial presence of
Aboriginal societies in Canada and their occupation of lands but, prior to
1996, the Court had not laid down any rules for determining which
practices and traditions qualified for protection as Aboriginal rights and
which did not. This matter became particularly important when Aboriginal
rights were accorded constitutional protection (along with treaty rights,
which will not be discussed in this paper) at the same time as the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms was introduced in 1982. This protection was
provided by section 35( I ) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which states that
"The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of

Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed."1 The intention was to identify
and define Aboriginal rights by political means and, possibly, by further
constitutional amendment. But even though four constitutional conferences
were held in the 1980s to accomplish this task, the talks foundered over the
issue of Aboriginal self-government. As a result, identification and
definition of Aboriginal rights were relegated to the legal forum of the courts
by default.2
The

Supreme

Court

first

considered

the

effect

of

the

constitutionalization of Aboriginal rights in the Sparrow case, decided in
1990.3 In that case the right in question-the right of the Musqueam
Nation in British Columbia to fish for food, societal, and ceremonial
purposes-was accepted by the Court without the need to formulate a test
for identification of Aboriginal rights generally. The Court focused instead
on the issues of extinguishment and infringement of Aboriginal rights,
holding that the rights constitutionalized in 1982 are those that were
"existing" in the sense that they had not previously been extinguished by
clear and plain legislation or treaty. The Court nonetheless decided that the
constitutional protection provided in 1982 is not absolute-Aboriginal rights
can still be infringed by legislation if the government can establish a valid
legislative objective for the infringement that is substantial and compelling,
and show that the government's fiduciary obligations to the Aboriginal people
in question have been respected by consulting with them, infringing their
rights as little as possible in the circumstances, and paying them
compensation for any expropriation. This has become known as the Sparrow

justification test.
As Sparrow left open the issue of how Aboriginal rights are to be identified
and defined, the Supreme Court was obliged to return to this question in 1996
in the Vander Peet, Gl.adstone, and N.T.C. Smokehouse cases (the Vander Peet
trilogy)." We will focus our discussion on the Van der Peet case, as it laid down
the test for identifying and defining Aboriginal rights that was applied in the
other two decisions. That case involved charges laid against Dorothy Van
der Peet, a member of the Sto:lo Nation in British Columbia, for unlawfully
selling ten salmon that had been caught under the authority of an Indian food
fish license. In defense, she claimed an Aboriginal right to sell fish.
The Chief Justice of Canada at the time, Antonio Lamer, wrote the
majority judgment. In it, he created a test for identifying and defining
Aboriginal rights that is commonly referred to as the "integral to the
distinctive culture" test. In Lamer's words, "in order to be an aboriginal right
an activity must be an element of a practice, custom or tradition integral to
the distinctive culture of the aboriginal group claiming the right."5 Moreover,
the time for determining whether a practice, custom, or tradition meets this
test is the time prior to contact between the Aboriginal people in question and
the European colonizers. Practices, customs, and traditions that arose as a
result of contact do not qualify, as in Lamer's view they are not
"aboriginal." In the case at hand, although the Sto:lo had traded with other
Aboriginal nations and exchanged fish for other goods prior to European
contact, Lamer found that exchange of salmon for money or other goods
had not been an integral part of their distinctive culture. Dorothy Van der

Peet therefore did not have an Aboriginal right to sell salmon, even in small
quantities, as exchange of salmon had not been a defining feature of precontact Sto:lo society. Instead, it was incidental to the more primary activity
of fishing for food and ceremonial purposes, and so was not sufficiently
integral to their distinctive culture to be protected as an Aboriginal right.
Lamer's narrow, time-orientated approach to the identification and definition
of Aboriginal rights has been severely criticized. The two women on the
Supreme Court at the time, Justices McLachlin and L'Heureux-Dube, both
wrote strong dissenting judgments. While accepting Lamer's statement of the
appropriate test quoted above, McLachlin disagreed with the meaning he
attached to "integral." For her, a practice is integral to an Aboriginal culture
if it "is part of the unity of practices which together make up that culture.
This suggests a very broad definition: anything which can be said to be part of
the aboriginal culture would qualify as an aboriginal right protected by the
Constitution Act, 1982."6 She also thought that Lamer's approach was too
categorical,

leading

to

an

all-or-nothing

result,

and

incorporated

indeterminate subjective elements in identifying what is distinctive and
central to a culture. She preferred an "empirical historic approach" that would
allow judges to identify Aboriginal rights by asking: "ls this like the sort of
thing which the law has recognized [as an Aboriginal right] in the past ?"7 Her
goals seem to have been to avoid rigidity, and to ensure that Aboriginal
peoples, in keeping with their traditions and cultures, continue to have
access to the resources necessary to sustain their distinctive societies. In
keeping with these goals, she also rejected Lamer's pre-contact time frame

for identifying Aboriginal rights, suggesting instead that they should be
based on traditional Aboriginal laws and customs whose roots, while historical,
need not be traced to pre-contact times.
Justice L'Heureux-Dube was even more forceful in her dissent in Van der
Peet. She characterized Chief Justice Lamer's precontact requirement as a
"frozen right" approach that is inconsistent with Aboriginal perspectives,
arbitrary, and unfair because it places an overly onerous burden of proof on
the Aboriginal peoples. She preferred a "dynamic right" approach that would
allow for the evolution of Aboriginal rights over time so they would "maintain
contemporary relevance in relation to the needs of the natives as their
practices, traditions and customs change and evolve with the overall society in
which they live."8 As long as a practice, custom, or tradition was sufficiently
fundamental to the Aboriginal culture in question ''for a substantial continuous
period of time"-which she suggested could range from twenty to fifty years-it would

qualify for protection as an Aboriginal right.9 L'Heureux-Dube also criticized
Lamer's narrow approach to the definition of Aboriginal rights. Instead of
focusing on particular Aboriginal practices, traditions, and customs, as he did, she
favored a generic approach that would define Aboriginal rights in a more general
and abstract way. She wrote: "the aboriginal practices, traditions arid customs
which form the core of the lives of native people and which provide them with a
way and means of living as an organized society will fall within the scope of the
constitutional protection under s.35(1)."10 Moreover, she viewed section 35(1)
more broadly as protecting the distinctive cultures of the Aboriginal peoples
rather than particular activities that are "manifestations" of those cultures:

"Simply put, the emphasis would be on the significance of these activities to natives
rather than on the activities themselves." 11
It was unclear from the Van der Peet decision whether Lamer's "integral to
the distinctive culture" test would be applied to Aboriginal title to land.
Commentators feared that it would, as the ChiefJustice had written in his
majority judgment that "aboriginal title is the aspect of aboriginal rights
related specifically to aboriginal claims to land."12 Six weeks later, in the
Adams and Core decisions from Quebec, he elaborated on this connection
between Aboriginal title and other Aboriginal rights by holding that Aboriginal
rights, such as the fishing rights at issue in those cases, can exist independently
of Aboriginal title.
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While those rights may be site-specific, they do not

require the occupation and degree of use of land that is necessary to establish a
claim to Aboriginal title.
The Adams and Cote decisions are significant for another reason as well. In
both cases, Quebec argued that Aboriginal title to land could not exist in the
province because the French law that had been in place before the conquest
of New France by Britain in 1759-60 did not recognize Aboriginal land rights.
Chief Justice Lamer refused to accept this argument. Even if the province's
interpretation of precoriquest French law was correct (which Lamer found to
be a matter of some doubt), he was unwilling to make the existence of
Aboriginal title in various parts of Canada dependent upon which European
power-France or Britain-happened

to

colonize an area first. If Quebec's

argument were adopted, he said, it "would create an awkward patchwork of
constitutional protection for aboriginal rights across the nation, depending

upon the historical idiosyncracies of colonization over particular regions of the
country."14 He also found that it would risk "undermining the very purpose of
section 35( 1) by perpetuating the historical injustice suffered by aboriginal peoples
at the hands of colonizers who failed to respect the distinctive cultures of
preexisting Aboriginal societies."15 In this important respect, Adams and Core
affirmed an earlier Supreme Court decision that the law of Aboriginal title is
part of the federal common law that applies throughout the country.16
While the Adams and

Cote decisions

indicated that the Supreme Court

saw important distinctions between Aboriginal title and other Aboriginal
rights, the relevance of the Vander Peet approach to Aboriginal title remained
uncertain. It was not at all clear whether the Court would apply the integral
to the distinctive culture test in defining Aboriginal title. Resolution of this
important issue had to await the Delgamuukw decision, handed down in
December of 1997.

Defining and Proving Aboriginal Title to Land

The significance of Aboriginal title in Canada cannot be overestimated.
Unlike in the United States, where most Indian lands were acquired by
conquest or treaty during the course of colonization and westward
expansion, in Canada conquest of the Aboriginal nations did not occur,
and treaties involving land were limited for the most part to Ontario, the
Prairie provinces, part of the Northwest Territories, and smaller
portions of British Columbia. As a result, when Aboriginal title to land

was accepted as a legal right by the Supreme Court in the Calder case in
1973, over half the country was still subject to Aboriginal title claims. 17
Since then, some of these claims have been dealt with by modern land,
claims agreements, most recently by the Nunavut, Yukon, and Nisga'a
agreements. But large areas-particularly in the Atlantic Provinces,
Quebec, and British Columbia remain subject to these claims. In those
areas in particular, Aboriginal title has very significant implications for
land ownership and resource development.
The issue of the content of Aboriginal title came squarely before the
Supreme Court in the Delgamuukw case.18 That case involved claims by the
Gitksan (also spelled Gitsan) and Wet'suwet'en nations in north, western
British Columbia to ownership and jurisdiction over their traditional
territories, an area almost as large as New Brunswick. The trial was the
longest and most complex in Canadian history: it involved seventy, six
witnesses, fifty three affidavits, and 9,200 documents, and took 374 days of
court time. In a four hundred page judgment, Chief J ustice McEachem of
the British Columbia Supreme Court dismissed the claims, but that decision
was appealed up to the Supreme Court of Canada, which reversed the judgment
and ordered a new trial, in part because McEachem had not dealt with the oral
histories of the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en in an appropriate way by according
them the same kind of respect and weight that courts accord to written
histories.
While not coming to any -Oecision on the merits of the case, the
Supreme Court did lay down a number of principles to guide trial judges in

Aboriginal title cases. In addition to providing more scope for the use of oral
histories, the Court defined Aboriginal title, explained what is necessary
to prove it, clarified the extent of federal authority over it, and addressed the
issues of constitutional protection and infringement. Apart from the use of
oral histories, we will discuss each of these matters in tum, paying particular
attention to the Court's definition of Aboriginal title. Although the Court
declined to deal with the claim to jurisdiction, which it characterized as a
claim to self-government, we will nonetheless address this matter as well in
the next section of this paper.
Prior to the Delgamuukw decision, there was disagreement over whether
Aboriginal title is equivalent to ownership of land and thus includes natural
resources such as timber and minerals, or is limited to the uses the particular
Aboriginal nation made of the land in the past. Relying on the Vander Peet
decision, the governments of Canada and British Columbia argued in
Delgamuukw that Aboriginal title is limited to those past uses that meet the
test of being "integral to the distinctive culture" of the claimants. The
Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en, on the other hand, argued that Aboriginal title,
although inalienable except by surrender to the Crown, is otherwise
tantamount to fee simple ownership. Chief Justice Lamer, who wrote the
principal judgment, did not accept either of these positions. In addition to
being inalienable, he found that Aboriginal title differs from fee simple
ownership in a number of significant respects. First, it has its source in
occupation of land prior to assertion of sovereignty by the British Crown,
whereas fee simple title arises afterwards. Secondly, Aboriginal title has an

inherent limit that prevents the land from being used in ways that are
inconsistent with the attachment to the land that gave rise to it in the first
place. Finally, Aboriginal title is a collective right that is held communally by
all the members of an Aboriginal nation. Because of these distinctive
features, Aboriginal title is unlike any other common law property· interest-it
is sui generis.
Chief Justice Lamer nonetheless came down on the side of the Gitksan
and Wet'suwet'en on the vital issue of natural resources. Despite Aboriginal
title's special features, he said that it is "the right to the land itself," which
"encompasses the right to exclusive use and occupation of the land held
pursuant to that title for a variety of purposes, which need not be aspects of
those aboriginal practices, customs and traditions which are integral to
distinctive aboriginal cultures." 19 He went on to hold specifically that
Aboriginal title includes minerals, oil, and gas, even though exploitation of
those resources might not have been a traditional use of the land. So the
Van der Peet test does not apply to restrict the uses Aboriginal peoples may
make of their lands, though Lamer did say that the connection with the land
upon which Aboriginal title is based has to be "of central significance to their
distinctive culture".20 He hastened to add, however, that this need not be an
explicit element of the test for Aboriginal title, as occupation of land and
maintenance of a substantial connection with it would be sufficient in and of
themselves to show that an Aboriginal nation's relationship with the land was
integral to its distinctive culture.
This brings us to the matter of proof of Aboriginal title. Lamer said that

Aboriginal title can be established by proof that the Aboriginal people in
question were in exclusive occupation of the claimed lands at the time of
Crown assertion of sovereignty. Exclusive occupation is required, he said,
because the Aboriginal title it gives rise to is exclusive. However, he also
envisaged joint Aboriginal title where two or more Aboriginal nations shared
exclusive occupation. Lamer chose assertion of sovereignty rather than contact
as the appropriate time for proving the requisite occupation because that is
when Aboriginal title "arises out of prior occupation of land by the aboriginal
peoples and out of the relationship between the common law and pre-existing
systems of aboriginal law."21 It is a burden on the underlying title to land that
the Crown acquires along with sovereignty, and so cannot predate sovereignty.
In this respect, he distinguished Aboriginal title from other Aboriginal rights,
which as we have seen must have pre-contact origins, because Aboriginal title
depends simply on occupation of land, and so "does not raise the problem of
distinguishing between distinctive, integral aboriginal practices, customs and
traditions and those influenced or introduced by European contact."22 Also, he
found the date of sovereignty to be more certain.
Though Lamer spoke of Crown "assertion" of sovereignty, he must have
meant "acquisition," as that is when the Crown's underlying title to lands
would vest. But it is unclear whether he intended to limit this to acquisition
of sovereignty by the British Crown, or meant to include the French Crown
as well. In parts of Eastern Canada, the difference between these two dates
could be as much as 150 years, during which time considerable movement of
Aboriginal populations, and hence changes in occupation of lands, took

place. Also, in many areas of Canada the date of acquisition of European
sovereignty is at least as uncertain as the date of contact, as sovereignty
involves" murky legal questions as well as factual ones. Even more
fundamentally, it might be asked why the onus is on Aboriginal peoples to
prove their own title as against the European colonizers when we all know
that they were here occupying lands when the newcomers arrived.
In addition to defining Aboriginal title and explaining how it can be
proven, in Delgamuukw Chief Justice Lamer resolved an important issue
concerning the division of powers between the federal and provincial
governments. Under Canada's original 1867 Constitution, the federal
government was given exclusive jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands
reserved for the lndians."23 However, it was unclear whether "Lands
reserved" included Aboriginal title lands, or were limited to lands expressly
reserved under the Royal Proclamation of 1763, treaties, or statutes such as
the Indian Act. In Delgamuukw Lamer clarified this by deciding that
Aboriginal title lands are indeed encompassed by the words "Lands
reserved for the Indians." But he went even further by ruling that all
Aboriginal rights, including Aboriginal title, are within the very core of this
federal jurisdiction, which means that they are insulated from provincial laws
by the constitutional doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity.24 As a result,
Lamer held that ever since Confederation the provinces have lacked the
authority to extinguish Aboriginal title.
We have seen that Lamer described Aboriginal title as "the right to the land
itself ' and "the right to exclusive use and occupation."25 These descriptive

phrases clearly reveal that, despite its sui generis features, Aboriginal title is
proprietary in nature. It therefore should be entitled to all the protection that
English law, going back at least to Magna Carta in 1215, has traditionally
accorded to property rights. Moreover, unlike other property rights in
Canada, Aboriginal title is also constitutionally protected as an Aboriginal
right by section 35( 1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. But despite these
protections, when Lamer addressed the issue of infringement of Aboriginal
title in Delgamuukw he reached the startling conclusion that Aboriginal title
may be justifiably infringed for a variety of purposes, including "the
development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric power, the
general economic development of the interior of British Columbia,
protection of the environment or endangered species, the building of
infrastructure and the settlement of foreign populations to support those
aims."26 Most of these purposes fall within provincial jurisdiction, against
which exclusive federal jurisdiction and the doctrine of interjurisdictional
immunity, as we have seen, should protect Aboriginal title from infringement.
But there is an even more fundamental reason to be disturbed by Lamer's list
of justifiable purposes. The development of agriculture, forestry, and mining,
for example, require not just government regulation of Aboriginal title lands,
but a taking of those lands (or at least of the resources on or under them). As
this looks more like expropriation than infringement, one is left wondering
how this kind of treatment of the constitutional rights of the Aboriginal
peoples can be justified, especially if the governments doing the taking (the
provinces) have no jurisdiction over Aboriginal title. Moreover, as the Chief

Justice probably did not have in mind publicly owned farms, forestry
operations, and mines in this context, he must have envisaged the taking of
Aboriginal lands for private as well as public purposes. Government taking
of constitutionally protected property rights for the benefit of private
interests is a violation of fundamental principles.
Lamer nonetheless tempered this governmental power over Aboriginal
title lands by holding that consultation with the Aboriginal peoples affected
has to take place before their rights are infringed. The degree of consultation
depends on the extent of the infringement, and can amount to a need for
outright consent where the infringement is especially serious. Also, as he
said the government will ordinarily have to pay fair compensation,
infringement is not cost free. As the compensation payable may outweigh the
value of the infringement to the government, this last requirement might act
as an effective practical impediment to widespread government interference
with Aboriginal title.
In addition to Aboriginal title, the Delgamuukw case involved a claim by
the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en to jurisdiction, or a right of self-government,
over their territories. As mentioned above, Chief J ustice Lamer declined to
deal with this issue. He said: "The errors of fact made by the trial judge, and
the resultant need for a new trial, make it impossible for this Court to
determine whether the claim to self-government has been made out.
Moreover, this is not the right case for the Court to lay down the legal
principles to guide further litigation."27 However, in my view a right of selfgovernment is nonetheless implicit in the Delgamuukw decision. The next

section of this paper will examine this issue.

An Aboriginal Right of Self-Government

So far the Supreme Court has dealt directly with a self-government claim only
once, in the Pamajewon decision.28 That case involved a claim by the
Shawanaga and Eagle Lake First Nations in Ontario that they have a right of
self-government over their reserves that includes the right to regulate highstakes gambling. Delivering the principal judgment, Chief J ustice Lamer
assumed, without deciding, that the Aboriginal rights protected by section 35(
1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 include a right of self-government, but held
that the Shawanaga and Eagle Lake First Nations had not established an
Aboriginal right to engage in or regulate gambling. Applying the Van der
Peet integral to the distinctive culture test, he found that, although the Ojibwa
ancestors of these First Nations had gambled, that activity was not of
central significance to their societies. Moreover, there was no evidence that
they had regulated gambling. So their claim to self-government failed on the
facts. The Pamajewon decision nonetheless left the door open for Aboriginal
peoples to prove a right of self-government over activities that were integral
to their distinctive cultures, if they could also establish that they had
regulated those activities prior to European contact.
The Pamajewon decision has been criticized for, among other things,
taking a narrow, fragmented approach to Aboriginal self-government. The
Chief Justice refused to characterize the claim as being to "a broad right to

manage the use of their reserve lands," as the Shawanaga and Eagle Lake First
Nations wanted the Court to do.29 That, Lamer said, would "cast the Court's
inquiry at a level of excessive generality."30 He demanded greater specificity,
thereby obliging Aboriginal peoples to prove their right of self-government on
a piecemeal basis, activity by activity. Any possibility of establishing a broad
right of self-government over their lands and peoples appeared to have been
foreclosed by this decision.
Sixteen months later, the Supreme Court decided Delgamuukw. As we have
seen, it declined to deal with self-government then. But Chief J ustice Lamer
did make a very significant statement that has been taken to imply a right of
self-government over Aboriginal title lands. After observing that Aboriginal
title is held communally as "a collective right to land held by all members of
an aboriginal nation," he said this: "Decisions with respect to that land are also
made by that community."31 Now it is difficult to imagine how a community
can make decisions about their land without some form of political organization
that provides the means for collective decision-making. The communal nature
of Aboriginal title, in and of itself, therefore seems to necessitate selfgovernment.
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Moreover, as other Aboriginal rights, such as hunting and

fishing rights, are generally just as communal as Aboriginal title, the same
analysis should apply to them as well. So instead of attempting to prove a
right of self-government directly, Aboriginal peoples may have more success
establishing other Aboriginal rights first, and then asserting that a right of
self-government is entailed by the communal nature of those rights.

Conclusions

The beginning of the twenty-first century shows a lot of promise for the
Aboriginal peoples of Canada. Advances made by them in the political
arena, starting with the entrenchment of their Aboriginal and treaty rights in the
Constitution in 1982, have been matched by some solid victories in Canada's
highest court. In what is undoubtedly its most signifi- cant Aboriginal-rights
decision to date, the Supreme Court in Delgamuukw finally recognized that
Aboriginal title to land includes a right to exclusive use and occupation that
encompasses natural resources. Given the extent of unsettled Aboriginal title
claims, especially in the Atlantic Provinces, Quebec, and British Columbia,
the economic and political implications of this ruling are enormous. The
issue of Aboriginal self-government has also been simmering ever since the
constitutional conferences of the 1980s, but outside of agreements such as those
reached with the Inuit of Nunavut and the Nisga'a in British Columbia, it
remains unresolved. Given, however, that a right of self-government
probably underlies every other Aboriginal right, acknowledgement of its
existence by the Supreme Court cannot be far off.
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